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The revolution that Matthew Lipman inaugurated in educational the-
ory and practice in his Philosophy for Children program has two di-
mensions. The first—introducing philosophy as a subject matter in the 
elementary school—is based on the assumption that childhood is an 
appropriate stage of life to read, think, and talk about philosophical is-
sues like justice, friendship, what we mean by self, and so on. As such, 
it represents a change in the way some adults understand children as 
thinkers, meaning makers, communicators, and moral agents. The 
second dimension is pedagogical. It is the idea that a guided, open-
structured, dialogical speech community which he called “commu-
nity of philosophical inquiry” (CPI)--is the most appropriate way to 
practice the philosophical curriculum that he had developed with stu-
dents. This paper explores CPI as a concrete application of John Dew-
ey’s educational theory, which posits a drive towards the reconstruc-
tion of habits—including, and perhaps primarily, the reconstruction 
of habits of belief—as an ongoing result of the dialectical relationship 
between our current habits and what he calls “impulse,” and works to 
overcome through dialogue the gaps Dewey identified between child 
and curriculum, the “psychological and the logical,” and ultimately, 
between child and adult.
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Normal child and normal adult alike, in other words, 
are engaged in growing. The difference between them is 
not the difference between growth and no growth, but 
between the modes of growth appropriate to different 
conditions. With respect to the development of powers 
devoted to coping with specific scientific and economic 
problems we may say the child should be growing in 
manhood [sic]. With respect to sympathetic curiosity, 
unbiased responsiveness, and openness of mind, we may 
say that the adult should be growing in childlikeness. 
One statement is as true as the other. 
—Dewey, Democracy and Education
The quiet revolution that Matthew Lipman inaugurated in educational theory and 
practice in his Philosophy for Children program has two inseparable dimensions. The 
first—introducing philosophy as a subject matter in the elementary school through 
a series of philosophical novels written for children1—is curricular. Of course this 
is more than just curricular, because it is based on the idea—contested by “real phi-
losophers” since Plato—that childhood is an appropriate stage of life to read, think, 
and talk about philosophical issues like justice, friendship, what we mean by self, 
the nature of thinking, the body-mind relation, what it means to be “good,” and so 
on. As such, it is an idea that follows from a change in the way some adults under-
stand children as thinkers, meaning makers, communicators, and moral agents; it is 
a philosophical idea itself. What is more, it also opens naturally into the realization 
that all school curriculum—each of the disciplines—has a philosophical dimension, 
and that this dimension is the very one that makes it most meaningful, and, there-
fore, most necessary for education to be meaningful for children.
The second dimension is pedagogical. It is the idea that a guided, structured, 
dialogical speech community—a theory and a practice that Lipman, taking a cue 
from his friend and mentor Justus Buchler, developed and called “community of 
philosophical inquiry”—is the most appropriate way to practice with students the 
philosophical curriculum that he had developed. This idea is also a philosophi-
cal one, and it has far reaching implications, both practical and theoretical—for 
learning theory, for a theory of teaching, for argumentation theory, for a theory of 
knowledge, for group psychology, for moral education, and perhaps ultimately of the 
greatest importance, for grounded political theory and practice. Moreover, this is 
true not only in classrooms and schools, but also in a society peopled by the human 
subjects that emerge from those classrooms and schools. Lipman’s community of 
philosophical inquiry (CPI) is not just a pedagogical device, but rather the projec-
tion of an ideal speech community dedicated to a normative form of democratic 
practice—one that mediates the relationship between democracy as a form of social 
inquiry and dialogical philosophical inquiry as a form of communicative practice. 
My goal in this article is to explore the relationship between these two inau-
gural educational ideas—the second one in particular—and the transformational 
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educational geography that John Dewey mapped in broad strokes around the turn 
of the last century. Of course, Dewey was by no means alone on his own counter-
cultural map. Even a cursory look at the history of libertarian, anarchist, and so-
cialist educational praxis in the first three decades of the twentieth century reveals 
just how already present and vivid were the ideas and practices that he explored, 
and how deeply his nascent progressive educational theory and practice both influ-
enced and was influenced by libertarian and anarchist theory and practice (Avrich, 
2006; Manicas, 2008; Cremin, 1961; Veysey, 1973; Dewey, 1938). Neither Dewey 
nor the libertarian anarchists, however, even alluded to the possibility of commu-
nity of philosophical inquiry (CPI) among children, either in pedagogical or cur-
ricular terms; in fact it is likely that most of those true educational pioneers would 
have criticized the practice of CPI as excessively “abstract,” and in violation of the 
principles of “integrated education,” a term coined by Marx and adumbrated by 
Kropotkin, who described it as “teaching which, by the practice of hand on wood, 
stone, metal, will speak to the brain and develop it” (quoted in Avrich, 2006, p. 16). 
Although there is at least one recorded example of a children’s speech community 
in Bronson Alcott’s Temple School in Boston in the 1830s that was claimed as a 
precursor by anarchist and progressive educators (Alcott, 1991; Avrich, 2006, p. 
57), both anarchist libertarians and more mainstream progressives tended to em-
phasize interest-driven, hands-on experience associated with home industries and 
arts and crafts. Integrated education sought to counterbalance the abstract work 
that was identified as a major source of the dramatic irrelevance of the traditional 
school to children, and understood as promoting a deformed subjectivity in adults. 
Dewey’s claim that “[t]he child has not much instinct for abstract inquiry . . . [or] 
making technical generalizations or even arriving at abstract truths” (Dworkin, 
1959, p. 60) represents an opinion that was probably generally accepted among in-
novators of the time, and has historical antecedents in Rousseau and even Plato, 
who warned that introducing philosophical discourse to children would make for 
contentious, relativistic sophists.
Given this history of negativism towards the idea of practicing philosophy 
with children in any systematic way, I want to identify some fundamental elements 
of Dewey’s theory of inquiry and his philosophy of childhood that make it possible 
to understand communal philosophical inquiry as it is practiced in CPI as one 
way of realizing, not just the psychosocial ideals and practices of what at one point 
Dewey characterized as “radical democracy” (1989), but also as a living ground for 
those ideals and practices. I will argue that CPI exemplifies and models a form of 
reason that, grounded as it is in the concrete lived experience of oral dialogue and 
rigorous mutual and self-interrogation, is an affective and social process of collab-
orative concept construction that satisfies Dewey’s notion of educative experience, 
and that CPI can be as sensuous a form of group experience as is the experience of 
“hand on wood, stone, metal” for the individual. The kind of collaborative thinking 
that goes on in CPI at its best, I will suggest, addresses children’s urge to experience 
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a sentient or “felt” reason, which in turn is connected with Dewey’s insistence that 
no real discipline is possible in educational matters apart from real interest—that 
unless the child’s “own vital logical movement” (1986, p. 179) is triggered, any cur-
riculum remains inert (1972).
The concept of what I am calling “felt reason ” is identifiable as a major theme 
of the Romantic movement and its projection of the “new humanity” or revolution-
ary subject of late eighteenth and turn-of-the-century Europe. Beyond its prophetic 
enunciation in Rousseau’s Emile, perhaps its most classical statement is in Schiller’s 
On the Aesthetic Education of Man, published in 1795, in which the “form impulse” 
and the “sense impulse” interact dialectically and are subsumed in the form of the 
“play impulse,” which represents the human goal to “bring form into the material 
and reality into the form” (1965, p. 75). It can be argued that this dialectical ideal was 
an implicit horizonal objective for the educational initiatives emerging in the early 
nineteenth century—most famously in the work of Pestalozzi and Froebel, but also 
in the educational thinking of the nascent socialist and anarchist movements that 
were steadily articulated over the course of that revolutionary century, and which 
were reformulated for the raw, sprawling emergent democracy of the US by Dewey 
and his colleagues on the left. Indeed, what there is of radicalism in Dewey could be 
said to flow from the radical aesthetic of what he calls “immediate empiricism” (af-
ter William James’s “radical empiricism”).2 Communal, collaborative, philosophical 
dialogue as developed by Lipman is, I would suggest, an educational form that sat-
isfies the Romantic Schillerian normative ideal of “the possibility of a nature that is 
both sensuous and rational” and that “reconciles the laws of reason with the interest 
of the senses” (1965, pp. 60, 75)—that is, as a realm of abstraction that is immediate 
and concrete in its affect and implication. And I will develop this claim in the face of 
the implicit Deweyan critique, shared, not just by Plato and Rousseau, but by other 
biologically and evolutionarily influenced thinkers of the first half of the twentieth 
century, that talking about philosophical ideas with children, even in their own 
terms and with their own vocabulary, is miseducative to the extent that it removes 
them from their own experience, their own vital interests, and their own questions, 
which are the only authentic basis for the sort of inquiry that leads to the reconstruc-
tion of cognitive structure and belief, and as such to ethical reconstruction as well. 
The most direct route to the justification of the practice of CPI as concrete 
and relevant to and in line with children’s interests is, as I have already suggested, 
through understanding CPI as an ethical and a political practice, and there is very 
little here that conflicts with a Deweyan perspective. Although Lipman did not ini-
tiate his adoption and development of CPI on this basis, the practice has as many 
broad-reaching implications for moral education and for school culture and gover-
nance as for curriculum design and pedagogy. The existence and perdurance of an 
international network of small, private “democratic schools”3 have, in the central 
and widely adopted practice of a weekly “school meeting,” in which each person, 
adult or child, has one vote on issues generated by the members themselves, connects 
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the normative requirements of the ideal speech community with actual democratic 
practice in a vivid and practical way. The school meeting, however, has functioned 
satisfactorily for its users for years with a protocol something like Roberts Rules 
of Order, and does not appear to require teacher-facilitated group philosophical 
argumentation as a necessary dimension of governance. It is the problematization 
and reconstruction of habits of belief that is primary in CPI, and secondarily (if 
necessarily) psychosocial group practice, one major dimension of which is politi-
cal. Here democratic practice is not something to which philosophical inquiry is 
added; rather, it takes its discursive shape from its philosophical dimension, which 
is expressed in such a way that it opens naturally onto the ethical—onto the question 
“What then must we do?” As such it offers a prime example of Dewey’s oft-quoted, 
implicit exhortation: “Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for 
dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by 
philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men” (1917, p. 42). And because the 
practice is, in his words, “saturated” with the “social values and qualities” (1986, 
p. 167) that inform the child’s intellectual and ethical experience, it is a discursive 
zone that arouses the child’s “vital logical movement” in a way analogous to its 
arousal by wood, stone, and metal.
Perplexity, Problematization, Dialogue, Childhood, and 
Democracy: Historical Vistas
CPI, as developed by Lipman and his associate Ann Margaret Sharp, has many 
precursors, but its present historical location in a global world struggling to realize 
authentic democracy makes it such that it cannot be reduced to any of them. Philoso-
phy has always had an interlocutive dimension, and professional philosophers have 
always been in dialogue with other philosophers through texts and other forums. 
Traditionally, when philosophers actually meet we are more likely to expect a debate 
or an exegetical event. Socrates, although he was a great communicative genius and 
taught us many things about structured conversation, never really practiced com-
munal philosophical dialogue as Lipman envisaged it: one has only to single out 
the utterances of his interlocutors to see that he is engaged in a conversation with 
himself, however brilliant and colorful his methodology. 
Socratic dialectic represents only one set of speech acts among the larger set 
that CPI encompasses, which is broadly oriented to clarifying, coordinating, instan-
tiating, and evaluating the ideas that emerge from each participant in the group. It is 
an ongoing self-corrective process that involves offering and evaluating of examples, 
uncovering assumptions, identifying contradictions, posing further questions, and re-
viewing chains of argument. Socrates’ conversations—at least in the early dialogues—
do however give the impression of being speech events through and through: not dia-
logue from a distance, but oral and aural mutual encounter, speaking and listening. 
As such, they return us to the rhetorical space of orality—the preliterate culture the 
characteristics of which children, as polymorphs, still carry the traces (Ong, 1982)—
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which imbues the experience of CPI. The skills and habits that CPI builds upon are 
language based and to that extent genetic—given with membership in the human 
speech community, and not, in their origins anyway, artificially learned techniques. 
As such, CPI is at once a genetic human form—people sitting in a small circle and 
deliberating together—an evolutionary ideal and a pedagogical project, which im-
plies that it is developmental: one learns how to do it through practicing it over time, 
and that learning involves guidance through modeling and coaching. Therefore, it 
can be practiced in a way that is miseducative, and this calls for the formation of a 
set of guiding principles of practice, of which there is an ever-growing literature.4
The operational logic of CPI—the logic that Lipman displays children using 
in his novels and the logic in which he framed the discursive structure of com-
munal dialogue in CPI—is traditional Aristotelian, a logic of classes based on the 
three classical laws of thought—identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle. It 
is set out clearly in his first novel, Harry Stottlemaier’s Discovery, and its accompa-
nying manual, Philosophical Inquiry (Lipman, 1984). Because its main categorical 
statements—the “all,” the “some,” and the “no” statement (as well as, implicitly, the 
identity statement)—are clearly embedded in the structure of everyday speech, this 
logic is immediately available to children at least from kindergarten on. And be-
cause it is interhuman, interlocutive discourse, it is dialectical in a Hegelian as well 
as a Socratic sense; that is, it proceeds through a spontaneous, emergent process of 
negation and the identification and mediation of contradictions. Ask virtually any 
kindergartner to respond to the statement “all dogs are brown” and she will, with 
the speed of thought, identify a counterexample, and thus instantly downgrade the 
proposition to “some” statement status—and the group must go from there. The 
engine of CPI, whether among children or adults, is a deconstructive one—it begins 
by taking concepts apart through a process of generalization and instantiation. But 
its dialectical character, which seeks an ultimate goal of consensus, orients it to a 
process of ongoing reconstruction of those same concepts. 
On a more fundamental motivational level the logic of CPI is Deweyan and 
Pragmatic, for it is based on problematization in the interest of the improvement of 
a lived situation. Dewey’s logic is grounded in the biological world, and it operates 
through a continual process of reconstruction of the relationship between organ-
ism and environment, its goal being the adaptive enhancement of both.5 Inquiry 
begins when the relationship between a concept and the lived experience and nar-
ratives to which that concept relates shows enough dissonance and strain to trigger 
inquiry in order to correct it. We can return to the historical significance of CPI 
here in characterizing it as a form of discourse that emerges when there is a prob-
lem—when one is, as Dewey says, faced with a “dubious and perplexing situation” 
(Dewey, 1986, p. 190), when the automatic steering and control mechanisms of the 
vehicle of communicative culture no longer assure a stable meaning to the “social 
values and qualities” that “saturate” our experience. 
Historically speaking, such problems have only increased. CPI as an educa-
tional discourse has emerged—crystalizing out of a myriad of analogues and precur-
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sors—at a moment in which values are no longer fixed or certain, become contest-
able, and enter public discourse. As such, what Dewey calls the “primary situation” 
that functions to trigger philosophical inquiry, and which opens the possibility of 
the creation of new values and a “world that is experienced as different” (1986, pp. 
194-195), is a historical one that is common to us all: the cosmological bedrock of 
a previous age has shifted and cracked, and the reconstruction of meanings and 
values has become a matter of primary adaptive importance.
We may say that this loss of value-certainty is in fact a necessary characteristic 
of a postmodern—or post-“ism”—culture: that is, in a value context where the tra-
ditional ways of “fixation of belief” that Pierce (1877) identifies—tenacity, authority 
and the a priori—are found wanting, and we are generally, as a collective, seized by 
“a real and living doubt,” without which, he claims, genuine inquiry is not possible. 
In this social context, Dewey’s conditions for genuine inquiry are existentially pres-
ent in the culture, and CPI becomes a crucial form of communicative action. We 
may also, from a transhistorical perspective, identify this loss of value-certainty as 
a characteristic of democracy as a social phenomenon and a set of communicative 
practices, and as such about the problematization and reconstruction of personal 
and social power in and through various forms of a association. Dewey’s identifica-
tion of democracy as not just a political but also a social, communicative ideal sets 
the stage for CPI as a sort of ur-discourse, a model of an ideal speech community at 
the heart of any school community engaged in genuine democratic practice, and the 
only basis for a form of moral education worthy of the name. Philosophical dialogue 
is in the middle of it because, as Dewey himself said, “the chief role of philosophy is 
to bring to consciousness, in an intellectualized form, or in the form of problems, 
the most important shocks and inherent troubles of complex and changing societ-
ies since these have to do with conflicts of value” (1986, p. 30).
In a “radical” or “deep” democracy, or democracy understood as a moral ideal 
involving a “clear consciousness of communal life, in all its implications” (Dewey, 
1916, p. 149), the ideal speech situation demands what Foucault, reintroducing an 
ancient distinction, invokes as parrhesia (Gk) or truth telling—“frank” speech as 
opposed to rhetoric (e.g., debate or persuasion) and flattery (imitation) (Foucault, 
1981; and see Vansieleghem, 2011). In addition, in democratic discourse the inquiry 
is about solving real ethical problems—of justice and fairness, of empowerment, 
of agency, of basic governmentality, and of duty and necessary restraint6 —all of 
which are problems that emerge from a divergence of meanings and values that is 
based on a divergence of beliefs, which are often held unconsciously, or based on 
unexamined assumptions. 
To introduce philosophy as an invitation to truth telling in the form of col-
laborative epistemological, ontological, aesthetic, ethical, and moral inquiry, or 
social problem solving, in public schools is really quite a dramatic innovation in 
the group speech situation of traditional childhood education, which is typically 
modeled on the catechical, and on public acts of pious affirmation—of the gods, 
the ancestors, the elders, the homeland, the nation, the mores, the ideology. CPI 
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is, on the contrary, not public rhetoric or flattery, but rather negativity, interrup-
tion, problematization, interrogation, reinvention, self-correction, and episte-
mological and moral suspense. To introduce this form of speech to children is to 
initiate a change in conventional adult-child school discourse, which is perhaps 
why so many adults (and prematurely socialized children) find it hard to do. It 
implicitly tests adult authority—not just epistemological, but existential—in that 
it affirms the necessity of distribution—not just distributed thinking but distrib-
uted participation, and thus power—as fundamental to its developmental process. 
CPI makes children and adults co-inquirers, and as such invokes, not just Erich 
Fromm’s distinction between irrational and rational authority—the latter based 
“on competence, and . . . help[ing] the person who leans on it to grow,” the former 
“on power, and serv[ing] to exploit the person subjected to it” (2007, p. 31)—but 
also Dewey’s regular and often near-vituperative indictment of the adult practice 
of betraying children’s “original plasticity” or “original modifiability” by “an im-
patient, premature mechanization of impulsive activity after the fixed pattern of 
adult habits of thought and affection” (1922, pp. 96-97). He argues this from the 
Romantic conviction that “there is in the unformed activities of childhood and 
youth the possibilities of a better life for the community as well as for individu-
als,” and that childhood “remains a standing proof of a life wherein growth is 
normal not an anomaly, activity a delight not a task, and where habit-forming is 
an expansion of power and not its shrinkage” (1922, p. 99). 
CPI takes up Dewey’s challenge to adult blindness regarding the evolutionary 
possibilities of childhood in a concrete form. By creating a site in which the “fixed 
patterns of adult thought and affection” enter the space of interrogation and dia-
logue, it also implicitly challenges the ideological mechanisms of biologistic stage 
theory, which acts to deny children the capacity to reason. As a practice, CPI turns 
both Piaget’s stages of cognitive development and Kohlberg’s stages of moral devel-
opment on their sides, rendering them simply domains of reasoning which are no 
longer sequentially invariant: the seven-year-old is as capable, under conditions that 
allow and encourage, support, model and guide it, of reasoning, however weakly or 
sporadically, from a formal operational as from a pre-operational point of view; and 
from a postconventional, universal ethics orientation as from a social conformity 
orientation. And because it is by definition a space of dialogue and interrogation, CPI 
introduces both an element of interruption and even of implicit social danger into 
the adult-child collective we call school, which traditionally assumes the absolute 
epistemological authority of the adult. But it also introduces a concrete, workable 
discourse model for negotiating that danger in the form of ongoing philosophical and 
social reconstruction, which includes the reconstruction of the adult-child relation.
Impulse, Habit, Thought and Reason
In making adults and children co-inquirers, CPI positions them in a chiasmic re-
lationship, whereby growth—the aim of education according to Dewey—becomes 
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as relevant to the adult/teacher as to the child/student, albeit in different directions. 
This introduces us to a first concrete application of Deweyan educational theory to 
Lipman’s innovation. It begins at the heart of Dewey’s transactionalism, which posits 
a drive towards the reconstruction of habits—including, and perhaps primarily, the 
reconstruction of habits of belief—as an ongoing result of the dialectical relation-
ship between our current habits and what he calls “impulse,” or often “instinct.” 7 
Two other of the many binaries Dewey employs in his educational thinking—“child 
and curriculum” or, differently put, the “psychological and logical” and “child and 
adult”—represent analogous contrastive pairs. 
“Habit,” for Dewey, denotes dispositional structures, motivational sets, cog-
nitive schemata, regular response structures with their variety of thresholds—an 
overall initiative-and-response system or assemblage that is a cumulative product 
of the past—even the very last second before the present moment—and with which 
I meet the present moment. It represents my current state of adaptation to an onto-
logically uncertain future, to an existence that, as Dewey describes it, is both “pre-
carious and stable” (1981). “Impulse” represents the desire, psychosomatic energy, 
anxiety, irritation, eagerness, curiosity, affective momentum—attention, intention-
ality, attentiveness—that challenges, animates and invests habit, but which habit 
also selects, interprets, shapes, channels, censors, canalizes, regulates, and guides 
in the transaction between them that is the present moment. 
If I am “growing”—if I am undergoing, in Dewey’s terms, “educative” (as op-
posed to “miseducative”) experience—impulse keeps habit flexible, adaptive and 
vigorous by continuously re-informing it, energizing it, often through an initial 
process of breaking it up, problematizing it, deconstructing it. In one sense impulse 
is time itself—the temporal as an ongoing irruption. In subjective terms, it is analo-
gous to G. H. Mead’s “I,” which always escapes the internalized, socialized structure 
of the “me” (Mead, 1934). In this sense it is the ineffable. To widen the metaphor, 
we may say that the philosophy group of CPI represents subjectivity writ large, and 
its habits—its “me”—are the “fixated” beliefs, including both the uncoordinated 
beliefs of each individual and the more general beliefs of the culture. These more 
general beliefs make it possible for there to be enough agreement about the mean-
ing, for example, of the word “justice” to be able to problematize and interrogate 
it as a concept. The group’s impulse is for reconstruction of the concept to better 
reflect contextualized experience, and to better reorient and channel the desire for 
personal and social transformation which that impulse carries at its core—a desire 
of which childhood, for Dewey, is “a standing proof.” The drive for self-correction 
that motivates the group is one manifestation of the utopian drive, the upsurge of 
the normative, the ineluctable “ought.” It invokes the “Front” or “Not-Yet-Conscious” 
or “Novum” of Ernst Bloch—the sense of personal and social possibility that we all 
carry, of “a future which has not yet appeared in its own time” (Bloch, (1986, p. 127). 
The process of inquiry itself, from what I can make of Dewey’s somewhat el-
liptical account in Human Nature and Conduct, is triggered when a “present diffi-
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culty” (1986, p. 217) confounds a habitual response within a given situation. That is, 
the habit—in the case of CPI, a habit of belief (which necessarily informs patterns of 
behavior) regarding the status of a concept such as friendship, justice, life or “alive,” 
mind, language, “animal,” knowledge, happiness and so on, and the practices that 
both inform and are informed by the concept—no longer fits the situation. At this 
point the impulse—the desire, the energy, the implicit goal—that “animates” the 
habit is “impeded,” and in that moment is transformed into “thought.” “There is 
no thought without the impeding of impulse” (1922, p. 257), Dewey claims, and 
“Thought is born as the twin of impulse in every moment of impeded habit” (1922, 
p. 171). This may be thought of in psychoanalytic terms as a form of sublimation. 
Behaviorally, Dewey identifies it with being moved to “stop and think.” When there 
is group or distributed thinking going on, we may associate it with the opening of a 
collective noetic space that Dewey calls “reason,” which has emerged through these 
alchemical reactions as a sort of Apollonian zone that is at least temporarily im-
mune from the impetuosity of impulse because it has transformed it into thought. 
The open space of reason is by definition metacognitive, and it is experienced as a 
“period of delay, of suspended and postponed overt action, the period in which ac-
tivities that are refused direct outlet project imaginative counterparts. It signifies, 
in technical phrase, the mediation of impulse” (1922, p. 197).
The result of the opening of a space of reason through the mediation of im-
pulse is the reconstruction of habits—in the case of CPI, habits of philosophical 
belief. Given that we have entered the realm of reason, the implicit aim is the culti-
vation of habits of reasonableness, a theme that is present throughout both Dewey’s 
and Lipman’s work. “Rationality,” Dewey writes, “is not a force to evoke against im-
pulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. 
‘Reason’ as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions, 
such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit—to 
follow things through—circumspection, to look about at the context, etc. etc.” (1922, 
p. 196). We may associate this happy portrait with what Dewey also called “culti-
vated naïveté,” fundamental to his theory of “the method of intelligence,” which 
by definition may be understood as a learned—through the alchemy of impulse, 
world, habit and thought—set of dispositions of reasonableness that represents in 
fact a developmental sublation of childhood. “We cannot,” he writes, “achieve recov-
ery of primitive naïveté. But there is attainable a cultivated naïveté of eye, ear and 
thought, one that can be acquired only through the discipline of severe thought” 
(1981, p. 40). David Granger has characterized the notion of cultivated naïveté as 
an “interpretive dialectic between self and world that resists closure,” and as such 
emblematic of Dewey’s “cultural hermeneutics” (2000, p. 55)—a dialectic only made 
possible, I would suggest, by an interpretive dialectic between impulse and habit 
within the self. From the point of view of Lipman’s project of fostering the habits 
of reasonableness in children, it involves what Dewey describes as “the transforma-
tion of natural powers into expert, tested powers: the transformation of more or 
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less casual curiosity and sporadic suggestion into attitudes of alert, cautious, and 
thorough inquiry” (1986, p. 181). This, in fact, is its educational payoff.
CPI and the Fourfold Interests
Dewey employs a slightly different use of the concept “impulse” in a very early educa-
tional work, School and Society (Dworkin, 1959), where he identifies four “instincts” 
or “impulses” which, he says, characterize the deep structural impulse life of the 
child, and by implication, the human. They are: the “social” or “language” instinct, 
as shown in “conversation, personal intercourse, and communication,” which he 
considers “a great, perhaps the greatest of all educational resources”; the “instinct 
of making—the constructive impulse,” the “impulse to do” which “finds expression 
first in play, in movement, gesture, and make-believe, [then] becomes more definite, 
and seeks outlet in shaping materials into tangible forms and permanent embodi-
ment”; the “instinct of investigation,” which “seems to grow out of the combination 
of the constructive impulse with the conversational”; and the “expressive” or “art” 
instinct, which also “grows out of the communicating and constructive instincts. 
It is their refinement and full manifestation” (Dworkin, 1959, pp. 57-61). I would 
suggest that the process of CPI—both psychodynamic and cognitive—provides a 
social framework for the interplay of what Dewey calls “these fourfold interests.” It 
is their creative and adaptive systemic interaction that, in the context of CPI, prob-
lematizes, interrogates, and works to reconstruct the habits of belief that the group 
carries, as both an individual and a group task. The critical, dialogical process of 
CPI prods and forces their ongoing, never-completed reconstruction. 
The investigative instinct, articulated in communicative speech acts, interro-
gates concepts and the assumptions that inform them, and finds itself in a process 
of (re)construction, in shaping a narrative, a “tangible form” of an adjusted struc-
ture of concepts in their interrelationships and web of entailments—that is, in the 
emergent “argument.” The shared voice of the group itself, as the “refinement and 
full manifestation of this construction,” makes of CPI a sort of dramaturgy—the 
collective play, the expressive construction of a narrative that is as aesthetic as it is 
cognitive—that, as suggested above, amounts to a form of sensuous reason, a struc-
ture of concepts not abstract and removed from experience, but fully contextual-
ized, personalized, and made meaningful by their expression through the fourfold 
interests. In CPI, each individual, thinking for herself and with others, becomes a 
practicing philosopher, and the group as a whole shifts, self-corrects and develops 
as a philosophical and an ethical culture through the reconstruction and coordi-
nation of each individual’s philosophical beliefs.8
Problem posing and problem finding
The fact that CPI is a group process through and through offers a perspective on 
Dewey’s often reiterated assertion—related to his insistence on the necessary relation 
between “interest” and “discipline”—of the primary educational importance of how 
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and from where the “problem” or “disturbed and perplexed situation” or “present 
difficulty” (1986, pp. 200, 217) that triggers inquiry arises. A Deweyan perspective 
might question how a philosophical novel, however artfully arranged, or an equally 
artful list of philosophical questions exploring the concept of friendship,9 can trig-
ger the child’s intellectual curiosity and arouse her innate logical dispositions—or, 
to use Dewey’s third contrastive pair, close the gap between the psychological and 
the logical, the child and the curriculum. The Deweyan conviction that there is a 
crucial educational difference between encountering problematic situations in the 
course of some (everyday) activity and having someone or something intention-
ally problematizing experience for you enters a gray area when applied to what he 
called “primary situations” that are social. This conviction is reinforced by his re-
lated belief that, as he puts it in another early work (1972),
there will be a distinction according as children are mainly in the stage of di-
rect interest, when means and end lie close together, or have reached a capac-
ity for indirect interest, for consciously relating acts and ideas to one another, 
and interpreting one in terms of the other. The first, the period of elementary 
education evidently requires that the child shall be taken up mainly with di-
rect, outgoing , and positive activity, in which his impulses find fulfillment 
and are thereby brought to conscious value. In the second, the time of sec-
ondary education, there is basis for reflection, for conscious formulation and 
generalization, for the back-turned activity of the mind which goes over and 
consciously defines and relates the elements of its experience. (pp. 143-144)
Both of these views reflect a long tradition, based on the Lockean genetic 
epistemology (which, by the way, Dewey rejected) utilized by Rousseau to claim 
that “childhood is reason’s sleep”—or slightly less naïvely, that “man’s first reason 
is a reason of the senses” (Boyd, 1956, p. 54)—a belief codified and institutional-
ized in the ascendance of Piagetian developmental stage theory in the twentieth 
century. This view of childhood has had, it is true, a salutary effect on educational 
theory and practice ever since Rousseau, but besides representing a limited view 
of the phenomenon of “reason,” it is based on a biologistic view of childhood that 
traps it in chronological time, and it locks children in a sequential, organismic 
metaphor, ignoring what Merleau-Ponty (1964) referred to as their status as “poly-
morphs”—capable of assuming a variety of attitudes and functions in a variety of 
social situations—and what Vygotsky (1978) referred to as the “zone of proximal 
development,” which represents the profound difference that social and interac-
tional context makes to the possible operations of intelligence. To go beyond the 
biologistic view is to advance the philosophy of childhood in a direction towards 
which, in fact, Dewey’s epistemological and educational theory point, and Lipman’s 
pedagogical formulation may in fact be seen as one key exemplar of that advance. 
Be that as it may, I suggest that CPI as a discursive phenomenon satisfies Dew-
eyan motivational requirements on their own terms. Based on the requirements 
for authentic educational experience sketched above, Dewey might argue that CPI 
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represents a situation in which means and ends lie so far distant from each other 
that they are mutually indistinguishable, and that it is unlikely that philosophi-
cal questions have the power to transform impulse into thought, and to trigger 
the fourfold interests. It is important, however, to distinguish philosophical ques-
tions—which include ethical ones—from scientific questions, and it was in respect 
of the latter that Dewey developed his theory of inquiry, even though he made little 
epistemological distinction between the two, and if anything assimilated the former 
to the latter. But as I have already argued, philosophical questions are existentially 
present in the culture—they lie just under the surface of everyday life and conduct, 
and they are “saturated with social value.” They are potentially present every time I 
experience or witness an injustice large or small, or lose a friend or find that I have 
too many, or observe some unusual sign of intelligence in an animal, or attempt to 
communicate with an infant, or have an extraordinary dream, and so on. I have 
also suggested that we live in a historical era in which philosophical questions tend 
to become more and more visible as cultures and ideologies become increasingly 
intervisible, and absolutisms of all kinds less and less epistemologically viable. Nor 
is there any reason to assume that these doubts and questions are not communi-
cated, directly or otherwise, to children from an early age and in a multitude of 
ways, whether via media, peers, or real experience of difference.
Second, philosophical questions are, as characterized by Splitter and Sharp 
(1995), “common, central, and contestable.” The last of these is often the first thing 
children notice about them, and this can represent a liberatory experience, for the 
traditional school culture is one of “right” or “wrong” answers, in which the conflict 
of interpretations is suppressed, not just socially and politically, but epistemologi-
cally. The fact that they are common to all of us, central in importance, and above 
all contestable make of them questions most likely to check impulse and give birth 
to thought; and in a communal setting, their implicit dissonance interrupts the 
mimetic tendency either to conform our thought to that of others, or conversely, to 
polarize and enter debate. The process of conscious, careful deliberation on these 
questions is living proof to the child (and the adult) that in fact they are in some 
way related to scientific questions—that although they are practicably unanswer-
able in one authoritative way, their answers are not just a matter of opinion, that in 
fact the work of going about answering them is their answer to the extent they are 
explored, clarified, and seen in their relation to each other in that realm of “happy 
cooperation of a multitude of dispositions” called “reason.” The group work of go-
ing about answering them results, both for the individual and the group, in what 
Dewey calls the “intellectualization of the experience,” which he understands as 
the mark of an educationally worthwhile experience, one that “leaves behind an 
increment of meaning, a better understanding of something, a clearer future plan 
and purpose of action: in short, an idea” (1986, pp. 239-240).
Finally, philosophical problems as they are encountered in CPI are implicitly 
problems of behavior and conduct. Raised as they are in a social context—by the 
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members of a working group sitting in a circle—and, influenced by the facilitator’s 
modeling and coaching, concentrating on one anothers’ ideas of as intently as on 
their own, striving to maintain an ideal of undistorted communication while inter-
rogating both their own and their fellows’ beliefs and the assumptions that inform 
them: this could not more fully embody Dewey’s “social instinct”—especially when, 
as I have suggested throughout this article, this same circle is the one in which the 
group deliberates on and makes decisions about their own daily collective life—
about violations of rules or social expectations, about class and school governance 
issues, about (potentially) what shall be studied and how—all of which entail taking 
up common, central and contestable concepts. In its ethical mode—as an emergent 
curriculum in moral education—CPI is in fact the ur-discourse of the “miniature 
society,” “embryonic community,” “child’s habitat” (Dworkin, 1959, p. 41) of Dewey’s 
early formulation of the ideal in My Pedagogic Creed and The School and Society. It 
is the “school meeting” of the democratic school movement in philosophical mode, 
and the ethical expression of the school as a form of community life. 
Conclusion
The third dyad found in Dewey’s educational thinking, that of adult and child, re-
turns us to the epigraph, and to a broader theme of this article, which follows from 
the claim that Lipman’s formulation represents a change in the way adults might 
understand children—that is, as a historical development in the Western philoso-
phy of childhood.10 The change starts in Dewey to the extent that his understanding 
of childhood suggests the Romantic theme of childhood as, in Emerson’s famous 
phrase, the “perpetual messiah.” But Dewey’s child messiah asks us not to return 
to paradise, but rather to live the relation between impulse and habit through ex-
perimental intelligence, and thus to advance on a paradise that remains a perpetual 
horizon. Here the child as representative of impulse—and in Dewey’s other favorite 
terms, “plasticity” and “modifiability” of habit—challenges the adult as representa-
tive of over-mechanized and maladaptive habits, habits which thwart and foreclose 
on the ongoing reconstruction of habit that educational growth entails (Dewey, 
1922). The embryonic community, the miniature society of the adult-child collec-
tive called “school,” is the habitat of this perpetual messiah to the extent that it is 
organized to allow for the creative and adaptive dialectical activity of the child’s 
impulse-life through the exercise of the fourfold interests. 
The cost of this new, post-Romantic positioning of childhood is an exposure of 
children to the measure of cultural and even personal alienation that philosophical 
perplexity and problematization entail. Many would argue that it amounts to early 
exposure of children to the dark and ambiguous realities of historical existence that 
early protection may help them to face more optimistically when they grow up. For 
others the “philosophic mind,” as practiced in group dialogue, is a symptom of a 
sort of disease, or unhealthy addiction to doubt, against which children should be 
inoculated early. For yet others, to avoid philosophical problematization is itself a 
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kind of alienation, in the form of bad faith. For Dewey, it would appear to be the 
cost of the cultivated naïveté that he holds up as a subjective ideal. The latter fol-
lows from disillusion, deconstruction, critique—the perception of problems where 
there had been none before. We must, he argues, “divest ourselves” of the habits that 
we have unconsciously assimilated from our culture, and this involves interrup-
tion and negation. Only through undergoing the process of critical divestment of 
naïve cultural internalization is “intelligent furthering of the culture” a possibility 
(1981, p. 40). It may happen earlier or later in the life cycle, but there is no reason 
to postpone it; and if we understand human subjectivity as to a certain extent his-
torically determined, there may be periods in which it is in the interest of personal 
and social reconstruction that it happen earlier.
Lipman and Sharp’s formulation assumes that children are—in the interactive 
context of the adult-child relation anyway, and especially in the zone of proximal 
development that group deliberation creates—intellectually up to this task. Their 
assumption is grounded in Dewey’s logic of inquiry itself, which understands doubt, 
conflict, interruption, negation, as necessary to growth. The process of the ongoing 
reconstruction of habit as an engine of growth takes a special form in CPI, one that 
is a paradigmatic example of the method of intelligence. “What intelligence has to 
do in the service of impulse,” Dewey says, “is to act not as its obedient servant but 
as its clarifier and liberator” (1922, p. 255). This clarification and liberation is, fi-
nally, as appropriate and necessary and, in our present historical circumstances, as 
culturally unfamiliar a process for the majority of adults as it is for children. When 
Dewey says “with respect to sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responsiveness, and 
openness of mind, we may say that the adult should be growing in childlikeness,” 
he is not engaging in sentimentality. Community of philosophical inquiry is as rel-
evant and powerful—and culturally novel—a speech community for the adult as 
for the child, and, as such, it is a central and fundamental practice of, not just that 
ideal school that Dewey’s educational theory invokes, but of the reconstruction of 
philosophy as a communal and holistic practice—the practice of care of self, other, 
and community—which that ideal school implies. 
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Notes
1.  Lipman wrote six novels for different age groups, each of which is accompanied 
by a large compendium of thought exercises and discussion plans, which are organized ac-
cording to each chapter’s or episode’s “leading idea.”
2.  The connections between James’s and Dewey’s pragmatism and Romantic ontology, 
epistemology, and aesthetics have been ably explored over the last two decades. See Good-
man, 1990; Wheeler, 1993; Haskins, 1999; and Granger, 2003.   
3.  See http://www.idenetwork.org/schools/democratic-schools.htm.
4.  See, for example, Lipman, 2003; Gregory, 2006, 2007; Kennedy, 2010; Splitter & 
Sharp, 1995. And of course Dewey’s How We Think (1986) remains a guiding star of this 
literature.
5.  This is not just a characteristic of American Pragmatism; it is common early twen-
tieth-century developmental theory, influenced by biological and evolutionary studies.
6.  Vivian Gussin Paley (1992) presents a clear and powerful example of teacher-ini-
tiated communal social inquiry in her description of the process of introducing a new and 
controversial rule (“you can’t say you can’t play”) in her kindergarten class.
7.  Dewey justifies his interchangeable use of these two terms in a lengthy footnote in 
Human Nature and Conduct (1922, p. 105).
8.  The communal process of bringing philosophical beliefs to consciousness and in-
terrogating them through the four impulses operates in an analogous way when we apply it 
to the school curriculum as a whole. Here the four impulses meet the regulative concepts, 
the accumulated knowledge, the narratives, the methods and materials of the disciplines—
history, science, mathematics, music and art, literature—and enter into the same encounter 
that leads to reconstruction and aesthetic expression. What sets the philosophical curricu-
lum of CPI apart is that the concepts encountered there are encountered in the disciplines as 
well—concepts like organism, alive, fact, observation, person, progress, measurement, and 
so forth. As such, CPI acts as a container, a metaphor, and a symbol of the whole process of 
inquiry as it is practiced in the school community. See Kennedy & Kennedy (2011).
9.  For example, What is friendship? Can you be friends with an animal? With an ob-
ject? With your parents? Can someone you don’t like or who doesn’t like you be your friend? 
Is there one or more things that all friends do? What’s the relationship between friendship 
and love?
10.  For a broad interpretation of this development, see Kennedy (2006).
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